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Bogdanov affair in astrophysics is strikingly similar to Sokal’s
in "cultural studies". This paper discusses similarities between
Sokal and Bogdanov affairs, especially the outrageous
methods and behaviour of brothers Bogdanov, and
concludes that the latter affair has shown that natural
sciences and natural scientists are not beyond reproach,
beyond criteria of cogency, validity and criticism, as was
once suggested by Sokal’s affair. This has a broader morale:
Since "high science" is understood by fewer scholars, such
science is sometimes more prone to outrageous hypothesis
which would not be tolerated in the more common ones.
Therefore, there has to be at least a symmetry in critical
approach to scientific claims: neither the type of science, nor
the fame of scientists should provide a guarantee of proper
conduct and scientific methodology. The paper discusses
various meanings of symmetry in scientific approach to
science, and discussing "trust" and "distrust" in science
suggests a description of the s.c. "circle of credibility".
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The goal of the paper1 is to describe the state of the art in the
social studies of science. By enlisting problems with scientific
fraud of various kinds, it tries to answer the question about
the importance of relativism as a standard commitment in the
social studies of science (SSS), to assess the weight and long
term consequences of the previous affairs in SSS, most noto-
riously the Sokal's affair, and it tries to answer the question:1023
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have affairs from the last ten years left any visible scars on
SSS, and whether the scholars from the field have changed
their attitudes as a consequence? My answers to the questions
are positive: it is my contention that SSS has changed substan-
tially, in part as a reaction to the scandal in the science wars.
But my general purpose is to compare types of reactions
to scandals in science. In order to describe what happened in
the years following Sokal's affair (in the s.c. "science wars") in
the social sciences, I shall first describe a more recent scandal,
the Bogdanov affair in astrophysics and cosmology, to show
that SSS was neither the only nor the premier target of inten-
tional fraud and spoof in science in principle, and my conclu-
sion is that at the moment all is not rotten in social science,
but that something might be rotten in other, allegedly "hard
core" scientific disciplines.
Further, I explore what was theoretically wrong in SSS,
and what is nowadays wrong in cosmology. I draw conse-
quences for social studies of science, by rejuvenating the "sym-
metry principle" known from the times of the "strong pro-
gramme" in the sociology of science, to be sure, with a new
definition of the symmetry principle. It says that scientific sta-
tus of a discipline or of the hypothesis, is not a valid reason to
treat scientific claims differently from say pseudo-scientific
claims. We should not have an a priori asymmetrical explana-
tion, just because some sciences or scientists have a better
reputation than others. This new definition of symmetry may
also be called "circle of credibility".
THE BOGDANOV AFFAIR
In 2002 French twins, physicists Igor and Grichka Bogdanov
published at least six papers under various titles: "Topological
theory of the initial singularity of spacetime", "Topological O-
rigin of Inertia", "The KMS state of spacetime at the Planck
scale" and "Topological field theory of the initial singularity of
spacetime", in highly respected scientific journals, such asAnnals
of Physics, Classics of Quantum Gravity, and a host of others
(like Chinese Journal of Physics, Czech Journal of Physics), on the
conditions that occurred at the Big Bang. Annals of Physics and
Classics of Quantum Gravity are highly respected, and have No-
bel Prize winners in their editorial boards.
The Bogdanov papers asserted that there is evidence of
what happened during the beginning of the Big Bang,
known as the Planck era. According to the Big Bang sce-
nario, the Universe (or at least the part of it we can ob-
serve) experienced an extremely dense and hot era (bot-
tom), possibly starting from a gravitational singularity.
Since then, space has expanded, carrying matter and later







-known, back to the time of primordial nucleosynthesis;
however, there is less certainty about the events of earlier
epochs. Recent analysis of the cosmic microwave backgro-
und suggests that an inflationary era occurred at a much
hotter and denser epoch than nucleosynthesis. The even
earlier epochs are currently a matter of speculation, rang-
ing from a singular beginning of space-time to a bouncing
epoch (e.g., the Big Bounce); an eternal, non-singular ex-
pansion (e.g., chaotic inflation); and string theory-inspired
scenarios such as the ekpyrotic universe. Some of these
scenarios may eventually replace the now-standard infla-
tionary framework. In the case of a singular beginning (a
hypothesis which is presently impossible to prove either
theoretically or observationally), present knowledge tells
us nothing about what happened from the time of the sin-
gularity until approximately 10-43 seconds afterwards, an
epoch known as the Planck era. This is because space-time
at this point has to be described in terms of a quantum
theory of gravity, about which the scientific community
knows little. The Bogdanov publications purport to have
discovered what happened during this earliest epoch, and
even before the moment of the singularity itself.
(The Bogdanov Affair, Wikipedia)
At least three well known physicists, Roman Jackiw from
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Costas Kounnas from
École normale supérieure Paris and Jack Morava from Johns
Hopkins University, among other peers, reported favourably
on Bogdanov brothers articles. First rumors on the possibility
of fraud occurred in 2002, when German physicist Max Nieder-
maier reported that these papers were pseudoscientific,
consisting of dense technical jargon written to sound sci-
entific without having real content. In Niedermaier's view,
the Bogdanovs had tried to prove the existence of weak-
nesses within the peer-review system, much in the same
fashion that physicist Alan Sokal had published a deliber-
ately fraudulent paper in the humanities journal Social
Text.2 On 22 October 2002, Niedermaier wrote an email to
this effect which was then widely distributed. An eventu-
al recipient, the American mathematical physicist John
Baez, created a discussion thread on the Usenet newsgroup
sci.physics.research titled "Physics bitten by reverse Alan
Sokal hoax?" which quickly grew to hundreds of posts in
length.
(Bogdanov affair, Wikipedia)
This was just the beginning of the new stage of the Scien-
tific Wars, a series of disputes among postmodern scientists of
humanist bent, and realistic scientists mostly from natural scien-








A number of curious facts concerning the Bogdanov af-
fair strike us immediately. First, it is a sort of a reverse Sokal's
affair, which ten years ago purported and succeeded in show-
ing that the peer-review system in some social science jour-
nals (like Social Text) malfunctions if the paper uses the jargon
of the editors, if the theses conform to their general world
view, if it generously quotes from the sources favorable to the
editors' view, or endorses his political stances. Bogdanov af-
fair showed that such a procedure (of publishing fraudulent
work, with the intent to show weaknesses of the peer-review
system) is not constrained to postmodern humanist science,
but can affect even more respectable physicists and mathe-
maticians as well.
Unlike Sokal, who immediately admitted a hoax (Sokal,
1996a, 1996b), the brothers Bogdanov never admitted it. In
fact, they vigorously used to defend their ideas up till today,
and even created a ""Bogdanov affair" affair", by publicly de-
fending their rights to change the contents of the public arti-
cle on their affair. When some commentators tried to prevent
their interference with the contents of the site describing the
affair, they created a ""Bogdanov affair" affair", moving the fo-
cus of the discussion from the contents of their "theory" to the
topic of their rights to publicly defend their ideas. (Baez, 2006)
It is rather important to review Bogdanov affair in more
detail. Unlike Sokal, who was a respected physicist when he
performed his hoax, the Bogdanovs have received their Ph.
D.s (in 1999 and 2002) from University of Burgundy with
barely passing notes, and with referees' notes full of disclai-
mers. Secondly, from the 1980s the brothers Bogdanovwere ra-
ther popular TV presenters of funny popular science and sci-
ence fiction programmes Rayons X and Temps X on TV channel
France 2. Thirdly, with the money earned from the shows, they
have established an internet domain under the fake name "Inter-
national Institute of Mathematical Physics" (th-phys.edu.hk),
and "created erroneous suggestions amongst forum partici-
pants as to a possible link with The University of Hong Kong
or the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology" (Bog-
danov affair, Wikipedia). This fake "institute" intended to cor-
roborate their credibility, and a number of alleged physicists
have been used to defend the Bogdanovs on the internet.3
Further, they have published a bookDieu et la Science (God
and Science), which has "provoked a dispute of its own in 1992,
when University of Virginia astronomyprofessor Thuan accused
the Bogdanovs of plagiarizing his book The Secret Melody: And
Man Created the Universe" (Bogdanov affair, Wikipedia; Mona-
stersky, 2002).
These facts, the Bogdanovs' role as entertainers, their







their plagiary credibility in general (while constructing fake
research "Institutes"), could easily have made referees of re-
puted scientific journals more alert, skeptical and weary of
the contents of their papers. But they have not. In 2004 and
2006 the Bogdanovs published two more books – Avant la Big
Bang (2004) andVoyage vers l'instant zéro (2006) inwhich they con-
tinue with the semi-serious spoof of their creation, mocking
the whole science of physics.
The affair has continued to this date in an untimely fash-
ion, creating a host of usenet groups, blogs, additions of their
texts and the texts of their critics, and together with previous
facts, created a picture of a truly postmodern situation – in
which it is barely recognizable whether the whole affair is a
postmodern setup, a funny show, or a veritable, real scandal.
A reader who encounters the description of the affair for the
first time is not really sure whether the whole story is an elab-
orate hoax, whether some parts of the story present a hoax,
and the others criticisms, whether discussions on the usenet
groups are made up or written by idiots, where exactly to
draw the line between fiction and faction, and whom to be-
lieve. In ways more than one, the Bogdanovs have scored:
they published nonsense in the best physical journals, but
also, they made a lot of effort to stifle criticisms and outrage,
not by preventing anyone to discuss their work, but rather by
adding further nonsense to the already existing one. By clai-
ming that they mean everything they said, by suing critics of
their plagiarism, by convincing critics to withdraw parts of
their public utterances, they almost succeeded in blurring the
boundaries of fact and fiction, of right and wrong, of reality
and fiction, private and public, true and meaningless.
But it is rather significant that this was done by professed
physicists, not by sociologists.
Apart from the fact that respectable scientists, referees and
journals, with Nobel Prize winners in the editorial boards have
been fooled a number of times in succession, physicists who
have bothered to read all the Bogdanovs' texts have claimed
that the texts are just variants of the same fraudulent article
(Baez, 2002). In this sense, I think we are justified to say, the
Bogdanov affair proves to be even more serious than Sokal's.
Sokal's hoax (Sokal, 1996a, 1996b; Sokal and Bricmont, 1998),
created a public uproar, and as we shall soon see, in fact re-
versed the style of thinking in social sciences and its previous
public prestige. It made social scientists weary of commenting
scientific claims that they do not understand, and it made sci-
entific research more vigorous than before. Although Bogda-
nov affair made it to the public, (see for instance: Monaster-







bel, 2002; Morin, 2002; for a discussion among physicists see
Baez, 2002) Bogdanov affair, however, did not create a similar
public impact, and did not, at least not immediately, create
new publishing or research standards in physics.
Why is this so? Canwe learn anything from the Bogdanov
affair as we did from Sokal's? If we agree that Sokal showed
what was wrong with cultural studies, wemay now justifiably
ask: what is wrong with physics now?
One of the points of Sokal's affair was his implicit claim,
that there are two sorts of sciences: rigorous ones, with cred-
ible sources and methods (viz. empiricist and rigorous, clear-
ly defined theories in natural sciences), and postmodern cul-
tural studies, with all sorts of mumbo-jumbo written all-over,
on the other. However, Bogdanov affair proves, if anything,
that rigorous sciences, like physics, may be even more prone
to such hoaxes, at least by considering the fact that it has been
perpetrated several times, and that included the highest ranks
of physicists. One reason why such hoaxes may be more fre-
quent in physics than in cultural studies is the fact that the
contents of such papers, unlike in the case of postmodern cul-
tural studies, may be evaluated just by a rare few. Therefore,
we might have expected that a more stringent set of rules to-
wards fraudulent research will be put in place precisely for
such research. The other possible explanation is that something
is deeply wrong with physics, or at least with cosmology.
WHAT IS WRONG WITH CURRENT (NATURAL) SCIENCE?
Let's see then what is going on in contemporary physics. Let
us hear what respectable physicists have to say.
In 2005 a well-known editor of the Internet site Edge, John
Brockmann asked 100 most influential scientists to say what
they believe but cannot prove. A number of physicists have
given some striking answers. Philip Anderson, a Nobel laure-
ate from Princeton, for instance, claimed:
String theory is the first science in hundreds of years to be
pursued in pre-Baconian fashion, without any adequate
experimental guidance (italics mine). It proposes that Nature
is the way we would like it to be rather than the way we
see it to be; and it is improbable that Nature thinks the
same way we do.
Anderson, 2005
What Anderson says in effect, is that theoretical physics
of contemporary cosmology uses s.c. anthropic principles, which
lack empirical support, constructs universes from the facts
known to us today, and creates nature's laws upon our own
image. In a more speculative way, we may add to it by saying








Another physicist andNobel Laureate, LeonLederman from
Fermilab, answered the same question in the following fashion:
To believe without knowing it cannot be proved (yet) is
the essence of physics. Guys like Einstein, Dirac, Poincaré,
etc. extolled the beauty of concepts, in a bizarre sense, pla-
cing truth at a lower level of importance.
Lederman (Brockman, 2006)
Lederman claims that for contemporary physicists it is of
the essence to have beliefs that cannot be proved. The truth
of the belief is a minor, even an irrelevant add-up to the fact
that we have convictions. This claim can be understood as say-
ing that for physics of today, standard scientific criteria (truth,
empirical content etc.) may not be valid. Is it a wonder then,
that Bogdanov affair occurred, that it has been repeated a num-
ber of times, and that it did not create a scandal as Sokal's
affair did in the humanities? (To see other similar quotes from
eminent physicists, see my papers (Polšek, 1999, 1998, 1997).)
A more reasonable and a more sober voice was uttered
by a respected physicist Lee Smolin, from Perimeter Institute.
Unlike his Nobel Laureate colleagues, he feels that this descrip-
tion of contemporary physics presents at least a scandal of the
kind. According to Smolin, this is not the state we should
wish for, but rather a description of the "Crisis in Physics". For
us lay people in physics, it is of some interest to quote Smolin
at some length, to get a grip of the extent of crisis in physics.
For more than two hundred years, we physicists have been
on a wild ride. Our search for the most fundamental laws
of nature has been rewarded by a continual stream of dis-
coveries… (but t)he last time there was a definitive ad-
vance in our knowledge of fundamental physics was the
construction of the theory we call the standard model of par-
ticle physics in 1973. The last time a fundamental theory was
proposed that has since gotten any support from experiment was
a theory about the very early universe called inflation, which was
proposed in 1981.
Explaining adjustable parameters in string theory, Smo-
lin continues with a serious criticism of contemporary astro-
physics:
This means that the theory is unlikely to be definitively tested in
upcoming experiments. Even if the theory is not true, many pos-
sible outcomes of the experiments could be made consistent with
some choice of the parameters of the theory (italics mine)… No
matter what future experiments see, the results will be
compatible with vast numbers of theories, making it unlike-
ly that any experiment could ei-ther confirm or falsify string the-
ory. This realization has brought the present crisis to a head.
Steven Weinberg and Leonard Susskind have argued for a new







being subject to a definitive experiment whose result could kill
it… Among infinity of theories and infinity of universes,
the only predictions we can make stem from the obvious
fact that wemust live in a universe hospitable to life. If this
is true, we will not be able to subject our theories to experiments
that might either falsify or count as confirmation of them. But,
say some proponents of this view, if this is the way the world is,
it's just too bad for outmoded ways of doing science…When the
contact with experiment disappeared in the 1980s, we were left
with an unprecedented situation…We do not have a precise def-
inition of the theory, either in terms of physical principles or
mathematics. Nor do we have any reasonable hope to bring the
theory into contact with experiment in the foreseeable future. We
must ask how likely it is that this style of research can suc-
ceed at its goal of discovering new laws of nature…
Smolin, 2006
If we take these words as a fair description of contempo-
rary physics, and this does not seem to be too unreasonable,
we should pose even more important questions in the science
wars of the future than the ones raised by the Bogdanov
affair, and definitely more important ones than Sokal's. For
instance, if the majority of cosmological theories today (and
Smolin speaks of hundreds) do not have even a potentially
testable realistic verification, if they do not envisage potential
experimental proofs, is it reasonable for a society or a friend-
ly-hostile community of scientists to invest time and energy
in such research (science?), or for a society to invest huge a-
mounts of money in it, instead to dedicate such funds to im-
prove human condition, or at least in theories and scientists
who purport to do so?4 I am not an activist, but such a con-
clusion seems to me unavoidable.
Further, it seems that the Bogdanov affair pinpoints a
fundamental weakness in the "strong sciences", (in this case –
in cosmology): the weakness, sociologists of science were once
prone to – to treat speculations as legitimate theories.5
Apart from the myth that natural sciences always stick to
the methodological rules, one of which is to envisage for a
theory a possible test with reality, there are other myths, like
the myth of progress, exposed, for our present purposes by
John Horgan. Further argument for the crisis in "higher" ty-
pes of science (natural science) is provided by John Horgan
(Horgan, 2006). A notorious skeptic towards scientific progress,
science journalist John Horgan, in his article written for a 10-
-year's anniversary of his famous book End of Science reinsta-
ted his general thesis: We cannot expect any dramatic scienti-
fic discoveries in the future. But it is for the new arguments he
brings about, that we quote him:
Scientists' attempts to solve these mysteries often take the
form of what I call ironic science – unconfirmable specula-







science. (Science is ironic in the sense that it should not be
considered a literal statement of fact.) A prime example of
this style of thinking is the anthropic principle, which
holds that the universe must have the form we observe
because otherwise we would not be here to observe it. The
anthropic principle, championed by leading physicists
such as Leonard Susskind of Stanford University, is cos-
mology's version of creationism…Another example of iro-
nic science is string theory, which for more than 20 years
has been the leading contender for a "theory of every-
thing" that explains all of nature's forces. The theory's con-
cepts and jargon have evolved over the past decade, with
two-dimensional membranes replacing one-dimensional
strings, but the theory comes in so many versions that it
predicts virtually everything – and hence nothing at all.
Critics call this the "Alice's restaurant problem", a reference
to a folk song with the refrain, "You can get anything you
want at Alice's restaurant." This problem leads Columbia
mathematician Peter Woit to call string theory "not even
wrong" in his influential blog of the same title, which re-
fers to a famous put-down by Wolfgang Pauli.
Horgan 2006
Again, the formulation of the present malaise in the natu-
ral sciences (notably in astrophysics and cosmology) is very
similar to Sokal's verdict on the social sciences of the 1990s.
Speculation abounds, and in the overwhelming number of
cases, we cannot even say whether the proposed theory of a
hypothesis is wrong. According to Horgan, such formulas are
more akin to literature than science proper.
They adhere to the postmodern position that we do not
discover truth so much as we invent it; all our knowledge
is therefore provisional and subject to change. If all our
scientific knowledge were really this flimsy and provisio-
nal, then of course science could continue forever, with
theories changing as often as fads in clothing or music. But
the postmodern stance is clearly wrong. We have not in-
vented atoms, elements, gravity, evolution, the double he-
lix, viruses, and galaxies; we have discovered them, just as
we discovered that Earth is round and not flat.
Horgan, 2006
This description applies to other disciplines as well, for
instance neurology and psychiatry: "The postmodern perspec-
tive applies all too well to fields that attempt to explain us to
ourselves." (Horgan, 2006). What Horgan is saying, in effect,
is that the whole of science has become postmodern, in So-
kal's sense: it has become "ironic", skeptical, not serious, and
vacous. We may not go that far, but for our purposes, it suffi-
ces to say, that there are disciplines (and themost respected ones
at that), apart from SSS, where this description really holds.
So, all is not too-well in natural sciences either, although







WHAT WAS WRONG WITH PRE-SCIENCE
WARS SOCIAL STUDIES? ORIGINS OF TROUBLE
There are many accounts on what went wrong with science
studies, and how science studies have run into trouble. The
most respectable critics, the most ardent proponents of real-
ism, like Kitcher (2000) and Laudan (1996) are interestingly
looking for the sources of trouble in the philosophy of science
dominating the seventies and eighties, not in the social sci-
ences themselves.
I shall review just a few descriptions of the malaise in the
social sciences, but let us first see what has actually been at-
tacked and disputed.
Apart from Sokal's affair, one of the major and early con-
tributions to dismantling fraudulent or irrelevant social sci-
ence was a collection of articles gathered in a book A House
Built on Sand, edited by Noretta Koertge (Koertge, 2000). So-
cial sciences which the authors are attacking consist, accord-
ing to Koertge, of the following common tenets:
• Every aspect of that complex set of enterprises that we call
science, including, above all, its content and results, is
shaped by and can be understood only in its local histori-
cal and cultural context.
• In particular, the products of scientific inquiry, the so-cal-
led laws of nature, must always be viewed as social con-
structions. Their validity depends on the consensus of "ex-
perts" in just the same way as the legitimacy of a pope de-
pends on a council of cardinals.
• Although scientists typically succeed in arrogating special
epistemic authority to themselves, scientific knowledge is
just "one story among many." The more epistemological
authority that science has in a given society, the more
important it is to unmask its pretensions to be an enter-
prise dedicated to the pursuit of objective knowledge. Sci-
ence must be "humbled."
• Since the quest for objective knowledge is a quixotic one,
the best way to appraise scientific claims is through a pro-
cess of political evaluation. Since the "evidence" for a sci-
entific claim is never conclusive and is always open to ne-
gotiation, the best way to evaluate scientific results is to
ask who stands to benefit if the claim is taken to be true.
Thus, for the citizen the key question about a scientific
result should not be how well tested the claim is but,
rather, Cui bono?
• "Science is politics by other means": the results of scienti-
fic inquiry are profoundly and importantly shaped by the
ideological agendas of powerful elites.
• There is no univocal sense in which the science of one
society is better than that of another. In particular, Eurosci-
ence is not objectively superior to the various ethnoscien-
ces and shamanisms described by anthropologists or in-
vented by Afrocentrists.1032
• Neither is there any clear sense in which we can talk a-
bout scientific progress within the European tradition. On
the contrary, science is characterized chiefly by its com-
plicity in all the most negative and oppressive aspects of
modern history: increasingly destructive warfare, envi-
ronmental disasters, racism, sexism, eugenics, exploitation,
alienation, and imperialism.
• Given the impossibility of scientific objectivity, it is futile
to exhort scientists and policymakers to try harder to re-
move ideological bias from the practice of science. Instead,
what we need to do is deliberately introduce "corrective
biases" and "progressive political values" into science. There
is a call for "emancipatory science" and "advocacy research."
Koertge, 2000: 8
We can summarise some general points of dispute bet-
ween "realists" and "relativists" by some famous quotations:
1. Constructivist epistemology. Paul Forman speaks ap-
provingly of "our postmodern works" with its social construc-
tivist epistemology and a "morality based, rather that truth
basedWeltgefuehl".
2. The natural world is not a criterium of truth. According
to Harry Collins (Collins, 2007: 3) "(t)he natural world has a small
or non-existent role in the construction of scientific knowledge".
3. Reality does not matter. According to Latour (1979: 237)
"reality is the consequence rather than the cause of the social
construction of facts".
According to Alan Sokal who made several valuable con-
tributions in the Koertge volume (2000) and elsewhere (Sokal,
Bricmont, 1998), the problem with postmodernism and phi-
losophy of science leading to postmodernism is in conflating
levels of trouble and (possibly) their explanation. According
to Sokal there are various levels of explanation:
1. Ontology. What objects exist in the world? What state-
ments about these objects are true?
2. Epistemology. How can human beings obtain knowledge of
truths about the world? How can they assess the reliability
of that knowledge?
3. Sociology of knowledge. To what extent are the truths known
(or knowable) by humans in any given society influenced
(or determined) by social, economic, political, cultural, and
ideological factors? Same question for the false statements
erroneously believed to be true.
4. Individual ethics. What types of research ought a scientist
(or technologist) to undertake (or refuse to undertake)?
5. Social ethics. What types of research ought society to en-
courage, subsidize, or publicly fund (or alternatively, to
discourage, tax or forbid)?
Sokal, 2000: 14-15
Consider first the two issues that seem to be at the core
of the problem, since relativists and constructivists always







structed explanations, to our framing of the notion of reality.
According to Sokal, in postmodernist works, "(w)e often find
phrases like "the social construction of facts" that intentional-
ly elide the distinction between facts and our knowledge of
them". This was partly due to the conflation of the two realms
(reality and our knowledge of reality), and partly, as we shall
soon see, upon the postmodernist' intention to change social
conditions by theorizing, especially in situations presenting
facts as something immutable and unchangeable. In general,
both claims (social construction, and changing social circum-
stances) have merged, and were used as if the notion of social
construction automatically brings liberation.
A good way to describe, and to solve the first problem
(conflation of reality and knowledge) is given by James Ro-
bert Brown. Brown (Brown, 2001), along with Sokal, schema-
tizes the trouble, and provides an answer, by following a use-
ful diagram (Table 1).
Objective Subjective
Ontology Water is H2O. (A fact about Water is tasteless. (A fact based on
independent nature.) us, not about independent nature.)
Epistemology Belief that water is H2O. (Based Belief that water is Zeus's urine.
on standard evidence from chemistry.) (Stemming from smoking too much
dope while reading the Iliad.)
Source: Brown, 2001: 103
According to Sokal, Brown, Kitcher (2000) and others, this
kind of a confusion led postmodernist, constructivist social
scientists to the extreme: to doubt in reality, and in any objec-
tive common-sense truth, at least if it serves to attack political
views with which they disagreed. Interestingly, social studies
of science (SSS) have recently changed their relativist stance,
not by accepting the arguments above, about conflating epis-
temological and ontological levels, but rather under the influ-
ence of another argument: when it was shown that radical
relativism jeopardized any possibility to criticize political op-
ponents – right wing creationists for instance, or that it would
put in question some "indubitable" facts – like global warming
(see Latour's remark below).
Philip Kitcher, a well known British philosopher summa-
rized the postmodern trouble itemizing the s.c. "four dogmas
of science studies" (Kitcher, 2000). According to Kitcher, these
troubles belong to the philosophical realm: 1. Theory Laden-
ness of Observation: There is no truth save social acceptance; 2.
Underdetermination of Theory by Evidence (Duhem-Quine thesis):
no system of belief is constrained by reason or reality, and no












of symmetry) – that "there shall be no asymmetries in expla-
nation of truth and falsehood, society or nature" and 4. "Actor's
Categories" and the Writing of History: whereby "narratives
must be constructed in terms of "actor's categories".
There are no easy solutions to the first two dogmas, but
just as the notion of construction all-too-easily conflated the
epistemological and ontological realm, Kither proves that the-
ory ladenness and underdetermination of theories need not
provide sure ground for relativism and postmodernism. In
the text that follows, we shall discuss "dogma of variety of be-
lief", and reinterpret it in the light of the previously said, and
leave dogma #4, about "actor's categories", for some future dis-
cussion.
While discussing the first two "dogmas", Larry Laudan
(1996) went even further, and blamed the whole tradition in
philosophy of science (positivists as well as post-positivists)
for using the idea of "framing", "linguistic representation of
reality", for a "discourse" in which the notion of representa-
tion of reality by definition cannot reach reality.
These two critics testify to the fact that sociologists of sci-
ence were not the only, not even the primary causes of post-
modernist malaise. But, to be sure, they carried already pre-
pared philosophical notions to rhetorical extremes.
The second type of problem stems from the postmod-
ernist, and modernist, idea that science should be engaged.
The idea that social construction of reality, as conceived
by constructivists, automatically brings liberation was ana-
lyzed by the Canadian philosopher Ian Hacking. In his book
Social Construction of What? (1999), after analyzing a range of
social phenomena, Hacking concludes with the following:
The idea of social construction has been wonderfully lib-
erating. It reminds us, say, that motherhood and its mean-
ings are not fixed and inevitable, the consequence of child-
bearing and rearing. They are the product of historical
events, social forces, and ideology… Unfortunately social
construction analyses do not always liberate. Take anorex-
ia, the disorder of adolescent girls and young women who
seem to value being thin above all else. They simply will
not eat. Social construction theses are liberating chiefly for
those who are on the way to being liberated. For all their
power to liberate, those very words, social construction can
work like cancerous cells.
Hacking, 1999: 2
Furthermore, Hacking, in effect, is proving a very simple
idea that some constructed facts are not good as such or not
worthwhile, while some facts that can be constructed need







One may realize that something, which seems inevitable
in the present state of things, was not inevitable, and yet
is not thereby a bad thing. But most people who use the
social construction idea enthusiastically want to criticize,
change, or destroy some X that they dislike in the estab-
lished order of things.
Hacking, 1999: 7
Sokal's point in his hoax (Sokal, 1996a, 1996b) was to show
that postmodernists fail in their professed goals. The idea of
engaged science (especially as the only way of measuring rel-
evance in science) ended up precisely with its opposite.
So, instead of automatically deriving liberation from the
idea of "social construction", some scholars have translated
the political engagement into four distinct categories. Accor-
ding to Brown (2001), science and politics do not match. There
are various combinations of scientific and political stances
(Table 2).
Political Left Political Right
Hostile to orthodox Some social constructivists, Religious conservatives,
views of science postmoderns anti-Darwinians
Friendly to orthodox Sokal, Chomsky, Gould, Some sociobiologists,
views of science Lewontin, the Vienna Circle race and IQ theorists
From: Brown, 2001: 266
WHO HAS WON THE SCIENCE WARS?
So, on the basis of all things discussed, one can pose the ques-
tion: who has won the science wars?
Reviewing issues raised by Sokal's hoax, James Robert
Brown (Brown, 2001)mentioned several on-going historical bat-
tles between camps or among various scientific fractions; the
first allegedly being between the protagonists of enlighten-
ment and romantics at the beginning of the XIX century, the
second between the first and the second culture, described by
C. P. Snow, in the 1950s. Brown's broad perspective gives us a
possibility to pause, and review the present situation more
thoroughly.
Sokal's hoax was a blow to many humanities. A number
of scholars in the social studies of science felt at the time that
there would be no immediate recovery. But a striking fact was
that humanities (sociology of science, cultural studies) did
recover. For instance, even the still living proponents of cul-
tural studies, of postmodern "theory", felt (with a significant
time-lag) that something with humanities went seriously a-
miss, and therefore proposed different styles of thinking, and











Eagleton, who begins a review of cultural studies in his After
Theory with the following words:
The golden age of cultural theory is long past. The pio-
neering works of Jacques Lacan, Claude Levi-Strauss, Lou-
is Althusser, Roland Barthes and Michel Foucault are se-
veral decades behind us. So are the path-breaking early
writings of Raymond Williams, Luce Irigaray, Pierre Bour-
dieu, Julia Kristeva, Jacques Derrida, Helene Cixous, Jur-
gen Habermas, Fredrick Jameson and Edward Said. Not
much that has been written since has matched the ambi-
tiousness and originality of these founding mothers and
fathers. Some of them have since been struck down. Fate
pushed Roland Barthes under a Parisian laundry van, and
afflicted Michel Foucault with Aids. It dispatched Lacan,
Williams and Bourdieu, and banished Louis Althusser to a
psychiatric hospital for the murder of his wife. It seemed
that God was not a structuralist.
Eagleton, 2003: 1
Other primadonnas of cultural studies have voiced the same
disappointment with the state of the art in the cultural stu-
dies. Bruno Latour, in his "WhyHas Critique Run out of Steam"
for instance claims:
I myself have spent some time in the past trying to show
"the lack of scientific certainty" inherent in the construc-
tion of facts… But I did not exactly aim at fooling the pub-
lic by obscuring the certainty of a closed argument – or did
I? After all, I have been accused of just that sin... Was I fool-
ishly mistaken? Have things changed so fast?... While we
spent years trying to detect the real prejudices hidden be-
hind the appearance of objective statements, do we now
have to reveal the real objective and incontrovertible facts
hidden behind the illusion of prejudices? Was I wrong to
participate in the invention of this field known as science
studies? Is it enough to say that we did not really mean
what we said? Why does it burn my tongue to say that
global warming is a fact whether you like it or not? Why
can't I simply say that the argument is closed for good?...
Should I reassure myself by simply saying that bad guys
can use any weapon at hand, naturalized facts when it su-
its them and social construction when it suits them? Should
we apologize for having been wrong all along? Or should
we rather bring the sword of criticism to criticism itself
and do a bit of soul-searching here – what were we really
after when we were so intent on showing the social con-
struction of scientific facts? Nothing guarantees, after all,
that we should be right all the time.
Latour, 2004
This disappointment with cultural studies is felt elsewhere,








But in other, more stringent humanities and social scien-
ces, most notably in the field of economics and psychology, there
are other visible signs that humanities and social sciences have
recovered from Sokal's blow. We see a serious move towards
finding facts, facts, facts, out of which as yet no visible para-
digm has come to the fore.7 But at least this drive to collect
new facts on human nature, on rationality and cognition, on
selfdelusion and bias, on societal facts and correlations, gives
us promise that one day new humanities will get their own
Einstein. And this analogy brings us to the issue: it is the hu-
manities and social sciences nowadays that give us hope, and
the promises for the betterment of humankind, not by criti-
cizing science, but by doing science proper: by making and
testing theories, by experimenting and designing applications.
And we, not the physicists are looking for a new Einstein, a
genius who would be able to make sense of the vastness of al-
ready collected pure data.
Noretta Koertge wittily said in 2000 that "(a) respectable
account of the broader historical context of the Science Wars
awaits the touch of a future Gibbon." (Koertge, 2000: 6) It is
true, that describing circumstances surrounding Science Wars
(in all its phases) feels like an immense task. But we need no
future Gibbon to tell us what to think now. We need no social
circumstances, or politics, or change in society to bring the
question to the fore, whether postmodern posturing was a
proper way of doing "theory", and we also need no external
circumstances to explain and believe that something wrong
was going on in theoretical physics.
And precisely with this conclusion we reach the true and
original message of the SSS and perhaps of cultural studies.
WHAT HAS BEEN THE EXIT STRATEGY?
WHAT MIGHT BE AN ADDITIONAL EXIT STRATEGY?
One "exit strategy" from the constructivist-realist clash was to
frame legitimate claims of both camps, by replacing outrageous
postmodernist claimswith the ones sensible people would have
to endorse. According to Kitcher and Sokal (Koertge, 2000),
the sides in the science wars may be grouped in two clusters:
The first is the realist-rationalist cluster which endorses the fol-
lowing claims:
1. In the most prominent areas of science, research is pro-
gressive, and this progressive character is manifested in
increased powers of prediction and intervention.
2. Those increased powers of prediction and intervention
give us the right to claim that the kinds of entities des-
cribed in scientific research exist independently of our the-








3. Nonetheless, our claims are vulnerable to future refuta-
tion. We have the right to claim that our representations of
nature are roughly correct while acknowledging that we
may have to revise them tomorrow.
4. Typically our views in the most prominent areas of science
rest upon evidence, and disputes are settled by appeal to
canons of reason and evidence.
5. Those canons of reason and evidence also progress with
time as we discover not only more about the world but
also more about how to learn about the world.
The second cluster is the so called socio-historical one
which endorses the following:
1. Science is done by human beings, that is, by cognitively
limited beings who live in social groups with complicated
structures and long histories.
2. No scientist ever comes to the laboratory or the field with-
out categories and preconceptions that have been shaped
by the prior history of the group to which he or she be-
longs.
3. The social structures present within science, affect the
ways in which research is transmitted and received, and
this can have an impact on intratheoretical debates.
4. The social structures in which science is embedded affect
the kinds of questions that are taken to be most significant
and, sometimes, the answers that are proposed and ac-
cepted.
Kitcher, 2000: 34-35
When science wars are described in such a way, as a war
between these two camps, it becomes immediately visible
that it is very easy to find a "middle ground". According to So-
kal and Kitcher, the description above is precisely the middle
ground we are searching for: "Here the middle ground – ba-
sed on a respect for both the "realist-rationalist cluster" and
the "socio-historical cluster", even as we may debate their rel-
ative importance in specific cases – is so eminently sensible
that nearly all scientists and philosophers of science would
give their assent, as would most (though apparently not all)
sociologists of science." (Sokal, 2000: 18)
There are perhaps many other ways to solve problems
between two cultures and between sides in science wars.
However, I would like to suggest another simple strategy that
is completely oblivious and impartial towards sides in the sci-
ence wars.
Let me call this idea – the revitalization of the symmetry.
Drawing upon the description of Bogdanov and Sokal affairs,
let me draw a simple idea: since both sides on the science wars are
susceptible to fraud and prone to perform bogus science, we should







I am calling this idea "symmetry", although it has a trou-
bled history. For some historians of SSS, this point was even
pinpointed as the origin of trouble –within the so-called "strong
programme" of the Edinburgh school, most notably in David
Bloor's work (Turner, 2007; Zammito, 2007). I would like to mo-
dify some of Bloor's claims to fit the present situation. And by
doing this, I hope to show that strong programme is not be-
yond correction. As a matter of fact, I shall claim not only that
it becomes unproblematic, but rather that we can still keep its
normative flavour.
Strong programme's claims are, no doubt, well known:
causality, impartiality, symmetry, reflexivity (Bloor, 1976). Some
scholars doubted that reflexivity claim can be fulfilled, espe-
cially if you work in the field of sociology of scientific knowl-
edge, since then, allegedly, you run into a paradox. But I am
not going to deal with self referentiality.
The most disputed claim of the strong programme was
the symmetry claim (see among many, for instance Hollis,
1982; Hollis and Lukes, 1982; Slezak, 1989; Brown, 1984). This
claim means that we should investigate the sources of scien-
tific claim's credibility independently from its truth content.
We should, so to say, put the truth in brackets, and investigate
the question what kind of social and scientific ecology has
given a claim its status of truth.
But, let me rephrase the symmetricity claim, so that we
get rid of its problematic character. We should have no posi-
tive prejudices for certain kinds of scientific investigation.
Scientific claims, as we have seen in the Bogdanov affair, are
not infallible, even when they are uttered by the most popu-
lar and well known scientists. "High" science (like cosmology)
has prima facie no privileges in that respect. All beliefs are, to
start with, on a par.
The usual framing of the symmetry problem is in terms
of which camp is closer to the truth (for instance: the first cul-
ture of cultural scientists, or the second, of natural scientists
and engineers, or: Steven Hawking or perhaps Uri Geller).
But, there is another way to frame the problem: which kind
of science is more prone to fraud? In which area are we more
likely to expect fraudulent or bogus science?
Let us see the difference between the usual picture, a
hierarchical view, and the one I would like to argue for. In the
usual picture (for scientists), there is a world of difference
between pseudo-scientific claims (say of Uri Geller) and high-
-energy physics (or cosmology of Steven Hawking's kind). Sci-
ence starts with pseudo-science, transforms itself into purely
problematic, but perhaps testable claims, then it becomes or-
dinary (normal) science, and it ends up with the queen of sci-







This hierarchical view is rigidly asymmetrical. Consider
the "romantic" proposals provided by the famous cosmologist
Carl Sagan.
Scientific claims Pseudo-scientific claims
Speculation allowed Speculation not allowed
Claims proven wrong are incorrect Claims proven wrong are irrational
Fraud in the name of science allowed Fraud in pseudo-science should be illegal
(according to Carl Sagan, 1986)
Sagan considers two types of claims as varying in kind,
but does not give us a clue what should prima facie distinguish
them. Take an example. Sagan himself (Sagan, 1994) claimed
that several meteorites found on Earth are of Marsian origin.
Is this claim prima facie scientific, or is it bogus, pseudo-scien-
tific or perhaps even intentionally fraudulent? Should we pri-
ma facie allow such speculations, or should we discard them
right away? Well, we do not know before we test them. More-
over, it is not clear why should it matter in the first place. In
what sense is it important to ascribe such a claim scientific or
pseudo-scientific status even before we test the hypothesis?
Why should we make an a priori demarcation? Is it sensible?
What sorts of purposes would it serve to make such a priori
ascriptions?
It is more sensible to withdraw from judgement, and to
forget about whether the claim was uttered by a respected
scientist, or by some bogus lay man. The truth content of such
a claim has to be investigated no matter who has claimed it.
Or at least so we hope science should work.
In the discussion on the Bogdanov affair and contempo-
rary high physics, we have seen that "high" science or high-e-
nergy physics is not absolved from ordinary human mistakes
and human conduct in general. It is prone to the same types
of mistakes as the ordinary pseudo-science (unverifiability,
speculation etc.). So, instead of keeping a rigidly hierarchical
view towards science claims, if we want to keep the catego-
ries at all, we should re-draw the picture in the way showed
in Diagram 1.
If this is the proper picture of scientific "developments",
we see that in a sense we should expect more fraudulent or
speculative science the higher we climb the ladder. It is in the
area of high science (cosmology), not in the area of ordinary
science (like cultural studies) that we should expect to find
more speculation and more unverifiable claims.
But the whole argument for symmetricity does not hang
on the truth of the description (picture). My point is that we





speculation, and that precisely because of it, we should stay
impartial, and treat both (or perhaps all) kinds of claims in the
same way. This is the revitalized, or perhaps, this should have
been the original, idea of symmetricity.
High science Pseudo-science
Ordinary science Problematic claims
From: Polšek, 1997
In short, the idea of symmetricity does not jeopardize the
idea of truth, neither of independent reality, as Bloor was
interpreted to have it, but rather it is a methodological claim
to treat all statements as a priori equal before testing. And in-
stead of treating symmetry as a hallmark of irrationality, this
version of symmetry should be treated by the same token as
a gatekeeper of rationality, sensibility and justice.
This does not seem to be all-too-problematical. What
stays problematical is whether such a priori skepticism (or trust)
necessarily leads to skepticism towards science as such. Let
me consider examples:
Attitude: pro-science Attitude: anti-science
Methodology: asymmetrical Methodology: symmetrical
Confidence/Trust Shermer (pseudoscience) Strong programmers
Gardner (pseudoscience) Wallis (Rejected knowledge)
Sagan (pseudoscience)
Rothman (pseudoscience)
Perutz (science and war)
American Skeptics (pseudoscience)
Gross & Levitt (leftist science)
Sokal (leftist science)
Distrust Broad & Wade (misconduct) Milton (suppressed research)
Lewontin (social use of science) Heideggerians
Dewdney (science classics) Marxists
Grinnell (misconduct) Creationists
Bell (science financing, nepotism)
Freeman (psychology of scientists)
(see: Polšek, 1997, 1998, 1999)
Table 4 shows different attitudes towards science along
the axis trust/distrust in science, and pro-science/anti-science.











cism (type of science
studies in brackets)
agree with the revised idea of simple symmetricity. Whether
anyone accepts scientific claims in advance or not, and whe-
ther anyone has sufficient trust in science should be irrele-
vant, if we accept the very simple idea to treat all beliefs on a
par before they are put to test.
Of course, pragmatically we never do it. There is no suf-
ficient reason to test again the hypothesis that the world is
flat, or that the Earth is the center of the universe. But if any-
one comes again with such a brilliant hypothesis, we can ne-
vertheless showhim the accumulated evidence to the contrary.
My point in reviving the idea of symmetry is not to ex-
clude wild guesses, but to put them initially on a par with
rather obvious nonsense, to make a point: that no claim should
be a priori treated differently, and that all claims (no matter
whether they come from Uri Geller or Carl Sagan) should be
put to the same kinds of tests, the tests of reality and of accu-
mulated human experience.We should be equally trustful and
equally critical towards claims, independently from the ques-
tion of their social validity. The Bogdanov affair was another
very good lesson for doing so.
CONCLUSION
The Bogdanov affair has shown that a postmodern social situ-
ation (speculation, building artificial institutes, proliferation of
unimportant discussions, outright fraud, blurring the bounda-
ries of scientific importance and truth) may invade high science
of astrophysics, and that even the most respected or respect-
ful scientists are not infallible and beyond reproach. Human
and social sciences have learnt a lesson from Sokal's affair: the
level of (self)criticism has been raised, and outrageous claims
from previous times have been severely criticized not only by
external scientists, but by the proponents of postmodernism
themselves. (Perhaps, they have done so by fulfilling their "re-
flexivity claim".) Have other sciences done the same? I wonder.
But there is a reconciling way out. It consists in framing legiti-
mate theses of both sides in the science wars in a plausible way
for all. I have added another simple, and perhaps more achie-
vable criterion, a rather well known claim in science: to be as
critical, or as "symmetrical" as possible towards all scientific and
anti-scientific claims. Only in that waymaywe expect progress,
not only within disciplines, but in joint ventures of all scien-
tific endeavours. It goes without saying: only in that way may
we expect to diminish the number of fraudulent and bogus
research, and to be less prone to "scientific" hoaxes.
NOTES
1 I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for a very thorough read-
ing of the text, valuable comments and corrections. In several places







perspective of science financing. Also, there was a request to pin-
point the place of biological, especially genetic sciences within the
proposed matrices. While such comments raise very interesting issu-
es, their elaboration would expand the already oversized article. They
need not change my overall thesis, so I shall leave them to some
future occasion.
2 For a description of Sokal's affair, see text below.
3 Since the time of writing this article, several "respectable" web sites
at Hong Kong University have been created by Andrej Bogdanov.
See for instance http://www.cse.cuhk.edu.hk/~andrejb/
4 This kind of criticism is usual among "leftist" social scientists, espe-
cially of the "critical theory". See for instance: Adorno & Horkheimer
2002., Marcuse 1991.
5 I use "strong" ("hard") and "soft" sciences as vaguely corresponding
to the "natural" and "human" sciences. However, it is a truism among
scientists to treat physics and mathematics as being the "hardest" of
them all.
6 Note my analogous quadrant below (from Polšek, 1997).
7 At this point, an anonymous reviewer suggested an explanation for
the lack of the new paradigm which would purport to show that
"facts are in the service of politics and economy, not in the service of
important content". I do not believe that collecting facts in the field
of economy and psychology are necessarily, a priori, politically la-
den, but even if that were true, this could not explain the absence of
a visible paradigm in humanities.
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Afera Bogdanov u astrofizici vrlo je nalik na Sokalovu aferu u kul-
turnim studijama. U članku se raspravlja o sličnostima među njima
i posebno o zastrašujućim postupcima i metodama kojima su se
koristila braća Bogdanov, pa se iz rasprave izvlači zaključak da
prirodne znanosti i znanstvenici nisu "izvan domašaja" kritike, da
ih bavljenje "visokom znanošću" ne abolira od standardnih znan-
stvenih (i moralnih) zahtjeva, upravo kao što je to Sokalova afera
tvrdila za društvene znanosti. U tome leži i dublja pouka: budući
da "visoku znanost" razumije manje stručnjaka (i laika), ona je kat-
kada podložnija "ludim" hipotezama, koje se ne bi tolerirale u o-
bičnijim disciplinama. Stoga trebamo rabiti barem "simetrični pri-
stup" u kritici znanstvenih tvrdnji: ni vrsta znanosti ni slava znan-
stvenika ne smije biti garancija ispravna ponašanja i znanstvene
metodologije. U članku se razmatraju razna značenja simetrično-
sti u znanstvenom pristupu, a rasprava o "povjerenju" i "nepovjere-
nju" u znanost zaključuje se opisom tzv. "kruga vjerodostojnosti".












Die Bogdanov-Affäre in der Astrophysik erinnert stark an die
Sokal-Affäre in den Kulturwissenschaften. In der vorliegenden
Arbeit werden die Ähnlichkeiten zwischen den genannten
Kontroversen erörtert, vor allem aber die erschreckende
Vorgehensweise und Methoden der Brüder Bogdanov. Der
Verfasser kommt zum Schluss, dass Naturwissenschaften und
Forscher durchaus in den Einzugsbereich der Kritik fallen und
die Beschäftigung mit der „erhabenen Wissenschaft“ sie nicht
davon freisprechen kann, den Forderungen
wissenschaftlicher (und moralischer) Standards Genüge zu
leisten – im Gegensatz zu den Behauptungen, die im
Hintergrund der Sokal-Affäre laut geworden waren. Darin
liegt auch der tiefere Sinn dieser Vorfälle: Da die „erhabene
Wissenschaft“ von einer geringen Zahl von Forschern (und
Laien) verstanden werden kann, ist sie zuweilen stärker der
Gefährdung durch „verrückte Thesen“ ausgesetzt, die man in
gewöhnlicheren Disziplinen nicht tolerieren würde. Daher
sollte in der Kritik wissenschaftlicher Theorien zumindest ein
„symmetrischer Ansatz“ gepflegt werden: Es dürfen weder
ein bestimmter Wissenschaftszweig noch der Ruhm eines
Forschers als Garantie für korrektes Verhalten und korrekte
wissenschaftliche Methodologie betrachtet werden. Der
Verfasser erörtert verschiedene Bedeutungen eines
„symmetrischen Ansatzes“ und schließt seine Ausführungen
über „Vertrauen“ und „Misstrauen“ in die Wissenschaft mit
einer Beschreibung eines sog. „Glaubwürdigkeitszirkels“.
Schlüsselbegriffe: Bogdanov-Affäre, Sokal-Affäre, Symmetrie
der Kritik, Glaubwürdigkeitszirkel
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